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Abstract This paper provides an argument for the advantage of a pref-
erence for identity-consistent behaviour from an evolutionary point of view.
Within a stylised model of social interaction, we show that the development
of cooperative social norms is greatly facilitated if the agents of the society
possess a preference for identity consistent behaviour. As cooperative norms
have a positive impact on aggregate outcomes, we conclude that such pref-
erences are evolutionarily advantageous. Furthermore, we discuss how such
a preference can be integrated in the modelling of utility in order to account
for the distinctive cooperative trait in human behaviour and show how this
squares with the evidence.
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1 Introduction
Putting game theory to work necessitates a sound understanding of the
agents’ preferences over outcomes, i.e. of the ingredients of utility. Yet,
while abstract formal game theory has flourished since its introduction to
economic theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944, the discussion
of utility - until recently - has been less intense. As a consequence of this,
many applied studies of game theory have relied simply on (an affine transfor-
mation of) the agents’ material rewards as a proxy for the utilities associated
with the respective outcomes; a choice which is natural (although not imper-
ative) in view of the strong emphasis of non-cooperative game theory on the
agents’ rationality and self-interest. Over the last decades, though, a still
mounting evidence for the frequent disconformity of thus predicted and ob-
served behaviour has gathered - in particular for games which are not purely
competitive (e.g. public goods games). The evidence indicates that one of
the possible causes for this discrepancy can be found in the above mentioned
focus on material incentives in the modelling of the agents’ utility.
As a result of this, several amendments to the standard model of utility
have been proposed. For example, it has been argued that agents care about
fairness, i.e. have other-regarding preferences (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999);
that agents care about and reciprocate the intentions of their opponents or
counterparts (e.g. Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Rabin, 1993); or that agents
simply (and selfishly) prefer to act in accordance with their identity, i.e. the
social norms and stereotypes they have internalised (e.g. Akerlof and Kran-
ton, 2000; see also Benabou and Tirole, 2006b). All these approaches, which
will be discussed in a later section, have contributed to the improvement of
the empirical validity of game theory.
Against the backdrop of the increasing variety of new models of utility,
however, the question arises why, from an evolutionary perspective, imma-
terial concerns should influence utility and, once this question has been an-
swered, what this implies for its modelling. To argue why only material
rewards should matter for utility is straightforward. Much simplified, the
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argument would be that the more the agent possesses the higher his evo-
lutionary fitness so that material self-interest will prevail in the end. Yet,
apparently pure material self-interest is not compatible with the data; so why
is that?
Over the years, many attempts have been made to argue for the evo-
lutionary advantage of a cooperative trait in human behaviour, especially
in terms of reciprocity or, more recently, indirect reciprocity (e.g. Bester
and Gu¨th, 1998; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, 2005; see Henrich, 2004, for
a critical discussion). However, as Henrich (2004) points out, there are a
couple of deficiencies these approaches commonly suffer from. In particular,
the cost of the feature which mainly drives the selection process into the de-
sired direction usually is not accounted for. For example, if agents know the
preferences of their current opponent so as to adjust behaviour accordingly
(e.g. Bester and Gu¨th 1998) or if agents keep track of past behaviour of oth-
ers in order to reciprocate only the “right” ones (e.g. Nowak and Sigmund,
1998), this usually comes for free - irrespective of the size of the population
or the number in players of the game. Moreover, according to Henrich, most
approaches explore only repeated two player interactions, but fail to give a
plausible account of large-scale cooperation, as usually observed in human
societies, or cooperation in one-shot or anonymous situations, as commonly
observed in the lab (e.g. Camerer, 2003).
In the present paper, we address the question about the evolutionary ad-
vantage of immaterial concerns in the agent’s utility function from a slightly
different perspective which allows us to largely avoid the frequent short-
comings indicated above. Within a simple model of social interaction, it is
argued that the development, and dissemination of cooperative social norms
which detract the agents’ focus from pure material self-interest (e.g. fairness
norms) can be explained if (at least some of) the agents possess a preference
for identity consistent behaviour that impacts on economic decision making
(cf. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Thus, in contrast to previous attempts,
we do not argue for the evolutionary advantage of cooperative behaviour or
other-regarding preferences per se, but only for the advantage of a preference
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for identity consistent behaviour in the spirit of Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
in conjunction with cooperative social norms.1
For the subsequent analysis, social interaction is modelled as a repeated
random encounter between myopic, purely self-interested agents who play a
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game which is complemented by a subsequent
costly punishment opportunity. The idea of the punishment is to protect
mainly cooperative societies against the invasion of defectors (through per-
manent punishment of defection).2 However, as punishment is costly, its
enforcement is not evolutionarily stable. To establish cooperation nonethe-
less, i.e. to enforce the costly punishment of defectors, we assume that agents
can choose whether or not to identify with a social norm which prescribes the
following kind of behaviour: 1. cooperation; 2. punishment of defectors; 3.
(costly) monitoring of others such that, with a small probability, norm viola-
tors are recognised and (partly) separated from the norm-obedient agents. If
the norm is followed, the direct personal punishment (2.) will deter defectors
while the higher order social punishment (3.) will prevent the invasion of
both defectors and “lazy” cooperators who do not contribute to the costly
enforcement of the norm (which would again pave the way for an invasion of
defectors).
Eventually, the partial separation of the agents, i.e. the induced assorta-
tiveness of the matching process (cf. Bergstrom, 2002, 2003), is what drives
the selection process in favour of those who identify with and follow the
norm. Yet, this separation does not come for free in our model. It relies
on a costly ingredient of the norm (monitoring others), the performance of
which is strictly dominated from the agents’ perspective. Thus, in a sense,
the norm creates another social dilemma: although socially desirable, it is
not individually optimal to follow it. Consequently, without a preference for
identity consistent behaviour, defectors, who do not follow the norm, prevail.
However, once we introduce a fraction of agents with such a preference things
change. For these agents, norm-obedience is the dominant action (if the agent
1See North (1990,1993) for a discussion of the social value of cooperative norms.
2For empirical evidence on the role of punishment see, e.g., Falk et al., 2005.
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identifies with the norm). Hence, monitoring takes place and the assortative
power of the matching process can take the desired effect, i.e. norm-obedient
cooperators eventually dominate the society. As the preference for identity
consistent behaviour is necessary for agents to obey the norm, we conclude
from our argument that such a preference is evolutionarily advantageous.
Based on our previous argument, we also discuss how exactly a preference
for identity consistency in conjunction with (in our example cooperative)
social norms should be incorporated into a model of the agent’s utility as
relevant for decision making. In particular, it is argued that (and how)
the influence of social norms on the agent’s decision making should vary
with both the agent’s past experience and the general context in which the
decision takes place. In essence, the more a context is evocative of cooperative
social norms and the more the agent’s experience supports this view, the
more the agent will tend to adhere to the respective norms, as opposed
to material incentives, in order to avoid self-inconsistencies (e.g. a guilty
conscience). This effect is independent of the size of the population or the
frequency of the interaction, and it even allows us to naturally account for
the effects of anonymity (which, according to our argument, will reduce but
not immediately dispel the influence of the social aspect of the decision).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
a stylised model of social interaction and provide a formal evolutionary ar-
gument to motivate the development of a preference for identity consistent
behaviour in such an environment. In Section 3, we argue how such a prefer-
ence can be accounted for in a model of the agents’ utility if we allow for more
complex forms of interaction. Also in Section 3, we state the main general
implications of our argument regarding observable behaviour and illustrate
how they square with the evidence. Section 4 puts our discussion into the
context of the existing literature. Section 5 concludes.
5
2 The Basic Model
In this section, we study the evolution of behaviour in a society under differ-
ent assumptions about the agents’ preferences. In particular, we distinguish
between two cases: either agents have a preference for identity consistent
behaviour, referred to as id-preference, or they do not. Although we explic-
itly consider evolution only to select between different behaviours for a given
distribution of preferences, we ultimately will use the findings of our analysis
to argue in favour of the development of a widespread preference for identity
consistent behaviour itself.
In order to facilitate the exposition, the section is divided into three parts:
an introduction of the formal set-up of the model (2.1); a presentation of the
main results of the analysis (2.2); and, finally, a brief discussion of the results
and the importance of the assumptions for their derivation (2.3).
2.1 Set-Up
Consider a society with a continuum of agents. Each of these agents, during
his “life,” is involved in N periods of interaction with other agents from
that society. After the N periods, agents are replaced by their offspring who
inherit the preferences and copy the behaviour of their predecessors. The
underlying population dynamic is assumed to be payoff monotonic (Weibull,
1995), i.e. agents with higher aggregate material payoffs reproduce more
rapidly.
Regarding per period interaction, we assume that agents are randomly
matched in pairs to play the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) depicted in
Figure 1; specified individual payoffs indicate material rewards.3 Moreover,
after having played the PD game but before being rematched, players have
3Numeric payoffs are chosen only to facilitate later calculations. The PD-atypical
numbers ensure that, including punishment and monitoring introduced later, no agent
can obtain negative payoffs. Hence, payoffs can also be directly interpreted in terms of
offspring.
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the chance to enforce some (costly) punishment on their opponent.4 More
specifically, both players, knowing the outcome of the PD, have to choose
between punishment (p) and no punishment (p); the additional (economic)
payoffs being −2 per player in the case of punishment and 0 otherwise.5 In
effect, the punishment opportunity provides a potential means to hamper
the invasion of defectors into a mainly cooperative society. It allows coop-
erators to push the defectors’ payoff below their own in the majority of the
interactions (matches with a cooperator).6 Thus, if defectors are sufficiently
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Figure 1: The standard Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Apart from the basic interaction described above, agents can identify (I)
with a cooperative social norm or not (I). Identification takes place prior to
and independent of any later interaction. If an agent has an id-preference,
identification with the norm renders any behaviour which is incompatible
with the norm costly. The corresponding mental cost, denoted by c, is de-
ducted from the agent’s per period payoffs (for c > 2, this will ensure obedi-
ence). If the agent does not have the id-preference, per period payoffs remain
unaffected by the identity decision. The behaviour prescribed by the norm
is the following:
4Such an assumption appears justified as almost any type of social interaction offers
the chance to end in a quarrel. There may not be a second opportunity for a profitable
cooperation (e.g. a bargain) but there almost always is an opportunity to get into a row
about the one that was, and this row usually is costly for both parties involved.
5If both players choose p, a per agent payoff of −4 results.
6Meeting a conditionally punishing cooperator, defectors obtain 5, cooperators 6.
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N-1 Cooperate in the PD game.
N-2 Punish your opponent if and only if he has defected in the preceding
PD game.
N-3 Be vigilant as to whether others obey the norm or not.7
Vigilance, i.e. the act of keeping an an eye on the behaviour of others
(independent of the interaction agents themselves are involved in), is assumed
to be costly. In particular, being vigilant (v) is associated with a per period
material cost of ξ, 0 < ξ << 1; choosing not to be vigilant (v) is costless.
The purpose of the vigilance is to allow us to (plausibly) implement a
form of higher order social punishment for deviations from the norm. More
specifically, we assume that agents segregate into two classes: those who
identify and comply with the norm (the I-agents) and those who do not (the
I-agents). The segregation takes place on the basis of observed behaviour,
which we assume to be given by the identity decision as well as all actions
effectively chosen in any of the interaction including the vigilance.8 However,
only the identity decision is assumed to be immediately revealed to everybody
and to have an instantaneous effect on the agent’s group assignment. The
recognition of per period misbehaviour of any agent, by contrast, is assumed
to depend on the overall vigilance of the I-agents and to have a delayed effect
on the grouping.
In particular, if an I-agent in a certain period behaves in a way that
is incompatible with the norm, i.e. if he defects, refrains from punishing
a defector or from being vigilant, he will be found out with a probability
α := αˆ ·ν, where αˆ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the effectiveness of the monitoring system
and ν ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of I-agents who are vigilant. Once an agent
is found out, all his future offspring is relegated to the I-agents (despite the
7A lot of casual evidence indicates that vigilant behaviour indeed is “socially desired.”
Consider, for example, the ubiquitous requests on the London Underground to report any
unattended luggage to a member of staff. Also, people who witnessed a crime, i.e. a break
of a social norm cast in law, are commonly expected to give evidence in court.
8For a comment on the observability of the vigilance see Footnote 9 further below.
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fact that they still may claim to identify with the norm!).9 However, no agent
is informed about whether he has been convicted before the end of period
N .10 To sum up: public non-identification with the norm always leads to
immediate assignment to the I-agents; endorsement of the norm only ensures
placement among the I-agents if no predecessor has been convicted of a norm
violation.
Given the segregation, the matching of agents is such that each period
each agent is (randomly) matched with some other agent from his part of the
society with probability q. With probability 1 − q, the agent is (randomly)
matched in an environment to which all agents of the society have access
(cf. Figure 2). Thus, for q > 0 the matching is assortative in the sense of
Bergstrom (2002, 2003). Yet, notice that the segregation does not generally
separate cooperators from defectors but only agents who claim to identify
with the norm (and have not been proved not to) from those who do not
(or have been proved not to). After the N periods of interaction, agents are
replaced by their offspring who inherit the preferences and copy the behaviour
of their parent.
To wrap up, the overall process described above can be summarised as
follows:
Step-1 Agents choose whether or not to identify with the norm in a way
that is publicly observable.
Step-2 Agents decide (once and for all) how to play in the interaction; i.e.
9As concerns the observability of the vigilance and the potential consequences of not
being vigilant, casual evidence indicates that displayed lack of concern for the general
obedience to a cooperative norm will indeed be construed as lack of concern for the norm
itself. This in turn may well compromise the respective person’s reliability. Moreover,
the parameter αˆ, may also be interpreted as a measure for how likely it is to get into
serious trouble from not being vigilant. If the number of possible observations, i.e. the
number of interactions N , is sufficiently large, even very small values of αˆ will not affect
our argument.
10The assumption that disobedient agents are relegated at the end of the interaction
is made to simplify the subsequent analysis. If agents were relegated on the spot, an
argument similar to the one to follow could be given, for example, under appropriate
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Figure 2: The matching of agents. 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
agents decide whether to be vigilant (observable), whether to coop-
erate or defect in the PD (observable when chosen), and whether
and when to punish (observable when chosen).
Step-3 Agents are segregated according to their identity choices; yet, those
for whom some predecessor has been convicted not to follow the
norm are placed among the I-agents irrespective of their id-choice.
Step-4 The N periods of interaction take place.
Step-5 Agents are replaced by their offspring, the number of which is deter-
mined according to the relative amount of material payoffs acquired.
Each offspring inherits the preferences and copies the strategy of his
parent.
Step-6 The offspring is segregated according to the parents’ observed be-
haviour and the interaction is repeated.11
Notice that Step 1 and 2 – the strategy choices – mainly serve to anchor
the process, e.g. if a first round after introducing the norm is taken into
account. Otherwise, no actual “choice” is considered as all offspring by as-
sumption copies the behaviour of their predecessor (cf. Step 5; see Section
2.3 for a discussion).
11No strategy choices are necessary as the offspring is assumed to imitate the parents.
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The aim of the subsequent analysis is to study the long run evolution
of society according to the above described procedure for different starting
conditions, i.e. different assumptions about the presence of the id-preference
and the distribution of initial behaviour in the population. In order to give
a proper description of the different starting conditions, we need to specify
strategies first. Each agent i’s strategy can be viewed as a tuple si = (s1i, s2i),
where s1i specifies the agent’s identity choice, i.e.
s1i ∈ {I, I},
and s2i specifies the agent’s behaviour within society, i.e.
s2i ∈ {v, v} × {C,D} × {(pC , pD) | pC , pD ∈ {p, p}},
where pC (pD) denotes the punishment decision after observed cooperation
(defection) by the opponent. The set of all (pure) strategies s = (s1, s2)
is denoted by S. The initial distribution over strategies in the population,
which we consider as the starting point of our analysis, is referred to as the
starting strategy profile; it is denoted by
σ = [λksk]sk∈S,
where λk is the relative frequency of strategy sk in the society, i.e.
∑
λk = 1.
Slightly abusing notation, we write s ∈ σ if and only if s is played by a
strictly positive fraction of agents, i.e. s = sk with λk 6= 0. Finally, for any
repetition τ of the whole interaction (Steps 5+6), τ = 0, 1, ..., the expected
per period payoff of a strategy s ∈ S, given σ, is denoted by Epiτ (s | σ); the
index τ is omitted if there is no hazard of confusion.
By assumption, the society is split up into two subsocieties according
to the agents’ declared identities and the behaviour of their predecessors:
the I- and the I-agents.12 In order to determine the long run evolution of
12Recall, that in later repetitions, there may well be I-agents who pretend to identify
with the norm (although they will be known to only pretend).
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behaviour in the society, we first attempt to determine which strategy is going
to govern which part of society in the long run. Luckily, this is possible for
all cases considered in the sequel. Hence, matters can be decided by means
of a comparison of the expected payoffs of these strategies. We proceed with
some helpful definitions.
The first thing we are interested in are those strategies that are going
to dominate the respective subsocieties in the long run for a given starting
strategy profile σ. In order to determine these strategies, we have to account
for both the relative expected payoffs the different strategies earn (given σ)
and the probability that the offspring of an agent following a certain strategy
will actually remain within the respective part of society.13 Formally, we
define:
Definition 1 Let σ be a starting strategy profile and let s∗ ∈ σ. We say that
s∗ is σ-prevailing over s˜ ∈ σ among the ι-agents, ι ∈ {I, I}, if there is a
repetition τ0 of the interaction (Steps 5 and 6) such that for all τ > τ0:
Epiτι (s
∗ | σ) · P τ (s∗ | σ) > Epiτι (s˜) · P τ (s˜ | σ),
where P τ (s | σ) denotes the probability that, after repetition τ , the offspring
of an agent playing s remains among the ι-agents. A strategy s∗ is called
σ-prevailing for the I-agents (the I-agents) if s∗ is prevailing over all s ∈ σ
for these agents.
Apart from the question which strategy is going to prevail in which part
of society, we ask whether and which part of society will dominate the other
in the long run. Obviously, this question can be answered unambiguously if,
from a certain repetition τ onwards, the agents of one subsociety always earn
an average expected payoff which exceeds that of their counterparts from the
other subsociety by (at least) a certain amount µ > 0.14
13Recall that we assumed the underlying population dynamic to be payoff monotonic
(cf. Step 5) and that non norm-obedient I-agents may be relegated to the I-agents -
despite the fact that they still claim to identify with the norm.
14Requiring a constant minimum distance in the payoffs is not a necessary but sufficient
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Definition 2 For any starting strategy profile σ, the I-agents are called σ-
dominant if there is a real number µ > 0 and a repetition τ1 of the interaction,
such that for all τ > τ1 the average per period payoff earned by an I-agent
piτ (I) is at least µ units larger than that earned by an I-agent piτ (I). In the
reverse case, we say that the I-agents are σ-dominant.
If we have been able to identify a σ-dominant part of the society as well
as the respective σ-prevailing strategy, we can assess the long run evolution
of behaviour in the society. The strategy that, in expectation, will govern
the society in the long run is simply the one prevailing in the dominant part
of society.
Definition 3 Let σ be a starting strategy profile. A strategy s∗ is called glob-
ally σ-prevailing strategy or σGPS for short, if it is a σ-prevailing strategy
for the σ-dominant subsociety.
For the following analysis, we assume that all agents are risk-neutral
myopic payoff maximisers in the sense that they only care about their own
expected per period payoffs but not about their offspring.15 Accordingly, we
restrict attention to the evolution of behaviour, given the system started with
no agent playing a strictly dominated strategy - given his preferences (see
Section 2.3 for a discussion of this assumption). The starting strategy profile
σ is called an undominated full support profile if it derives from a case where
both types of agents assigns positive probability to any strategy which is not
strictly dominated for them. The following lemma specifies the undominated
strategies for those cases considered in the subsequent propositions.
condition which ensures the absence of difficulties in the limit. We choose it as it is most
convenient for the later argument.
15This assumption essentially ensures that for agents without the id-preference it is
strictly dominated to identify with and follow the norm. It is necessary as we do not
consider any other kind of discounting of future payoffs. Yet, rational agents would al-
ways trade off immediate gains, e.g. from not being vigilant, with the potential future
consequences, i.e. a possibly lower payoff for their offspring. Thus, with an appropriate
“standard” discounting of future payoffs, following the norm would still be dominated for
these agents - if N is not too small.
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Lemma 1 If the mental cost from norm-disobedient behaviour is sufficiently
large, i.e. c > 2, then the only strategies which are not strictly dominated for
the agents with an id-preference are:
s∗ := (I, v, C, p, p), s˜ := (I, v, C, p, p) and s := (I, v,D, p, p).
For the agents without an id-preference, the strategies
sˆ := (I, v, C, p, p), s′ := (I, v,D, p, p)
as well as s˜ and s specified above are not strictly dominated (but s∗ is).
2.2 Results
We now proceed to state the results of our analysis. First, we consider the
standard case, i.e. a society of agents who (initially) all lack the id-preference.
The result in this case is immediate and in fact the usual one, i.e. in the
end everybody will defect and neither be vigilant nor punish defectors. Thus,
simply introducing the norm (including a costly option to achieve assortative
matching) is not enough to establish cooperation. We state Proposition 1
without proof.
Proposition 1 Assume that none of the agents of a society has an id-
preference. Then, for any undominated full support profile σ, the σ-prevailing
strategies for both parts of society are such that all agents in the long run play
s2 := (v,D, p, p). The average per agent per period payoff is given by pi = 4.
The next proposition considers the other extreme case, namely the one in
which all agents of a society (initially) have the id-preference. It states that
for norm obedient behaviour to prevail in such a society it is sufficient to
require that agents are sufficiently separated. Intuitively, separation guaran-
tees that the I-agents (who all cooperate) earn the higher expected payoff as
it ensures that the relatively disadvantageous match of I-agents with poten-
tial defectors among the I-agents occurs sufficiently infrequent. Given that,
14
however, norm obedient cooperation obviously is advantageous.16 The proof
of Proposition 2 is deferred to the appendix.
Proposition 2 Assume that all agents of the society have an id-preference
and that the cost of identity inconsistent behaviour is c > 2. Moreover, let
σ be an undominated full support profile. Then, s∗ = (I, v, C, p, p) is the
unique σGPS, if I- and I-agents are sufficiently separated, i.e. if q > 3+ξ
5
.
The resulting long run average per agent per period payoff is pi ≈ 6− ξ.
Finally, we reconsider the above setting under the assumption that ini-
tially both types of agents, i.e. those with as well as those without the
id-preference, are present in the society. The potential trouble in this case
derives from the fact that for those agents without the id-preference, it is
always strictly dominant not to be vigilant and not to punishing defectors.
Yet, they may well claim to identify with the norm and, hence, start out
among the I-agents. In that case, their expected per period payoff is larger
than that of the I-agents with an id-preference playing s∗.
The point of the following proposition is to show that also under these
diverse starting conditions agents with an id-preference playing s∗, never-
theless, will prevail. To obtain such a result, we again have to assume that
the different subsocieties are sufficiently separated and that the number of
interactions N is sufficiently large. Intuitively, a large number of interactions
ensures that agents without the id-preference who only pretend to have iden-
tified with the norm but do not act accordingly17 are sufficiently likely to be
noticed and relegated to the I-agents so that the I-agents eventually consist
of norm obedient cooperators only. Separation again is necessary to guaran-
tee norm obedient cooperators a sufficiently high payoff through (eventually)
frequent matches among themselves.18 The proof of Proposition 3 can be
found in the appendix.
16 Yet, recall, that offering assortative matching without the id-preference is not suffi-
cient to establish cooperation if the assortativeness is costly (cf. Proposition 1).
17Recall that being vigilant is strictly dominated for agents without the id-preference.
18cf. Footnote 16.
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Proposition 3 Assume that a fraction of 1 − γ of the agents of a society
have an id-preference whereas the others do not, 0 < γ < 1, and that c > 2.
Moreover, let σ be an undominated full support profile. Then, s∗ is σGPS,
if q > 3+ξ
5
and if N is large, i.e. if N > N∗(q, αˆ, σ), where N∗ is decreasing
in αˆ, and increasing in q and λ∗0 (the relative frequency of s
∗ in σ).19 Thus,
in the long run the I-agents with an id-preference (playing s∗) will dominate
the society and will earn an average per period payoff of pi ≈ 6− ξ.
From the above proposition we conclude that, from an evolutionary per-
spective which also takes into account the competition of different social
groups for scarce resources, a (widespread) individual preference for norm- or
identity-consistent behaviour is advantageous as it enables the development
of a cooperative trait in society and, hence, leads to an increase in the re-
spective agents’ individual fitness (as compared to agents in non-cooperative
societies). No assumptions about general individual concerns for the utility
of other agents are necessary.
2.3 Discussion
In the above, we have studied the evolution of behaviour in a society of
agents which either possess or lack an id-preference. Our results essentially
show that a cooperative norm can be established in the society if and only if
at least some of the agents initially have a preference for identity consistent
behaviour. In these cases, norm obedient behaviour, in expectation, will
prevail (under certain conditions on the interaction) and the agents with
a preference for identity consistent behaviour, who follow the cooperative
norm, will dominate the society in the long run.
As already indicated in the introduction, the result in favour of norm-
obedient behaviour and, hence, the id-preference derives mainly from the
assortativeness of the matching process. This allows norm-obedient cooper-
ators to sufficiently separate from either do not cooperate at all or who at
19More specific conditions on N∗ are given in the proof of this proposition. To convey
a feeling for the requirements, for a uniform starting profile σ, q ≈ 35 , and αˆ ≈ 0.1 values
about N∗ = 25, which we consider to be very few interactions per lifetime, are sufficient.
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least do not contribute to sustain the norm. However, for the assortativeness
to gain effect, norm-obedient agents have to be vigilant - which is costly - in
order to recognise and separate from agents who undermine at (least some
part of) the norm. Thus, different form other approaches (e.g. Bester and
Gu¨th, 1998; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998), the cost of the mechanism which
eventually drives the selection process in the desired direction is taken into
account (see also Henrich, 2004). Moreover, although we also consider only a
two player interaction for our main argument (a PD game), the reference to
the social norm allows us to easily extend our result to cooperative behaviour
on a larger scale (cf. Section 3).
Another point we want to comment on is the assumption that agents
only use strategies that are not strictly dominated given their preferences.
Commonly, evolutionary models analyse how a population evolves under dif-
ferent starting conditions - including strictly dominated strategies. Yet, they
usually do so based on the assumption that all behaviour is genetically de-
termined and not chosen deliberately. This, however, appears to be rather
implausible if we look at human social behaviour. For the purposes of this
paper, we therefore only assume that agents inherit the preferences of their
predecessors but not their behaviour. As regards behaviour, we prefer to
think of agents as having some (arbitrary) belief about the behaviour of oth-
ers and choosing a best response against this belief - given their preferences.
As a consequence of this, we exclude strictly dominated strategies a priory
(they are never a best response), but otherwise allow for any undominated
full-support profile to begin with (agents may have whatever beliefs they
wish). Beliefs then can be thought of as being passed on from parent to
offspring, who act accordingly. For the sake of argument, this transmission
of beliefs within the model is implicitly assumed to work perfectly (in effect,
the offspring always copies the strategy of the parent). Notice, however, that
this assumption is not restrictive. In fact, also an occasional copying of other
parents’ beliefs, with the respective consequences for behaviour, would not
affect the outcome of our analysis as we consider full support starting profiles
anyway.
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Furthermore, we want to emphasise that not all assumptions made are
technically strictly necessary for our argument. In particular, results simi-
lar to the ones above can be obtained without requiring punishment to be
part of the norm. Being observable, vigilance alone would be sufficient to
establish the necessary separation between norm-obedient agents with an
id-preference (who cooperate and are vigilant) and other agents (who at
most cooperate but never are vigilant). Yet, introducing the punishment has
two advantages. First of all, the additional punishment makes it harder for
defectors to invade a mainly cooperative society. Thus, in contrast to other
purely costly ingredients that could be incorporated into the norm, e.g. burn-
ing some endowment prior to each interaction, punishment effectively helps
mainly cooperative societies to save resources. Accordingly, a norm with
punishment has a comparative advantage over one without once coopera-
tion becomes prevalent. Moreover, adding the punishment also seems to be
more plausible from an empirical point of view as cooperative social norms
commonly do not only prescribe cooperation itself but also punishment of
different order (i.e. direct punishment of defection as well as - higher order
- punishment of general norm-disobedience, e.g. unenforced punishment;20
cf. Section 3.2). The stylised norm employed here, which combines direct
punishment of defectors with indirect punishment of general norm-violators
through the vigilance, allows us to capture both aspects.
Finally, it is interesting to note that neither infrequent random matching
with agents from other societies nor infrequent migration of agents would af-
fect our argument. This again is due to the fact that we considered only full
support starting profiles.21 Societies that comprise merely agents without an
id-preference (considered in Proposition 1) might fail to settle for defection,
though, if norm-obedient cooperators with an id-preference could invade and
sufficiently separate themselves. This, however, would only further the even-
tual dissemination of the id-preference and, hence, strengthen our previous
argument.
20For example, witnesses of a crime are usually obliged to give evidence in court (with
few exceptions), and perjury itself commonly is liable to prosecution.
21The same holds true for mutations as long as no strictly dominated strategies, i.e.
strategies excluded by Lemma 1, are played.
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3 On How to Account for Identity in Utility
In the previous section, we have outlined an argument for the general ad-
vantage of an individual preference for identity-consistent behaviour within
a simplified model of social interaction. Building on this, we now want to
consider more closely, albeit less formally, how such a preference can be sat-
isfactorily accounted for in the modelling of the agent’s utility if the social
environment allows for more complex patterns in the interaction (3.1). Fi-
nally, we discuss the main behavioural implications of our considerations and
show how they square with the evidence (3.2).
3.1 General Discussion
So far, we have assumed that for those agents with an id-preference self-
inconsistent behaviour is associated with a fixed mental cost c that is high
enough to ensure obedience to the proposed norm. Assuming a fixed cost
was sufficient for our argument as the matching process was sufficiently ran-
domised. Yet, if we allow for patterns in the matching process, e.g. through
occasional long episodes of interaction with members from different societies
(e.g. as salesman or envoy), things change. Other societies may not follow a
cooperative convention but may primarily consist of defectors. And if there is
a chance of longer episodes of interaction with non-cooperative agents, a fixed
cost from disobedience with an internalised cooperative norm, which ensures
cooperative behaviour of an agent, may be considerably detrimental.22 Thus,
increasing correlation in the matching process, e.g. through increasing levels
of inter-group interaction (which certainly accompanied the development of
human societies), calls for a more flexible psychologic mechanism enforcing
cooperation where appropriate and defection where necessary.
Such a flexibility can be achieved, though, if we allow the cost from
22Recall that own cooperation given opponent defection plus the additional punishment
and vigilance results in overall economic payoffs of 1− ξ for the cooperator/punisher and
+5 for the defector, whereas the average payoff of an agent in the cooperative home society
is 6−ξ. Hence, longer episodes of matching with a defector can easily become detrimental
in terms of individual fitness.
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inconsistent behaviour c(.) to depend on the context (do norms apply or
not?) and to gradually adjust to the player’s past experience. Dependence
on the context allows the agents to agree on the general invalidity of a norm in
a certain context (e.g. cooperation with an opponent in a competitive game
of sports, or more drastically in war, is usually considered inappropriate). In
terms of our previous model, the offspring of agents who defect in a commonly
agreed context, may not be relegated to the I-agents.
Dependence on (recent23) past experience in turn allows the agents to
respond in a more deliberate way to the behaviour of their opponents even
if the general context is cooperative. If, for example, the agent has suffered
from a repeated defection by his opponents in the recent past, he now is
able to “learn” the inapplicability of the cooperative norm in the respective
context and may - with time - find it easier to adjust and defect himself.24
Returning to a more cooperative environment which allows for more positive
experience, however, the cost of non-cooperative behaviour may adjust back
such that the agent returns to cooperative behaviour. Again, in terms of our
model, the agents of a society may, for example, agree to relegate only the
offspring of repeatedly disobedient agents.25 In that case, if the readjustment
to a cooperative environment is sufficiently fast, a more flexible cost from
norm disobedient behaviour appears to be preferable.
In the following, we propose a stylised model of utility which still accounts
for the main parts of our prior argument (cf. Section 2) but nonetheless offers
the desired flexibility.
Assume that the agent’s utility, which he tries to maximise, is given by
a weighted average of the economic rewards pii and a psychologic component
c(.) which is related to the congruence of the agent’s behaviour with the in-
ternalised norms,26 that relative weights are fixed (idiosyncratic) constituents
23It appears reasonable to assume the impact of more recent experience to be stronger
in order to allow for a more flexible adjustment to potential patterns in the matching.
24For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Section 3.2.
25Also, potential gains from trade may outweigh the risk of such occasional norm-
violations in expected terms.
26This again is not to say that the agent’s economic benefit from a certain outcome pii
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of the agent’s identity, and that the cost from inconsistent behaviour is om-
nipresent and equal for all agents.27 The clear distinction between identity
dependent relative weights and a generally valid cost from norm disobedi-
ence is made for expositional purposes only. Yet, it also seems plausible as it
allows us to think of c(.) as some commonly agreed upon standard to which
agents can subscribe at an individual degree (relative to their economic self
interest captured by pii). Thus, only those agents with a (sufficiently strong)
preference for identity consistent behaviour bother about the psychologic
component whereas others do not - depending on the relative weights.28
Flexibility in the psychologic component of utility, then, is achieved by
assuming c(.) to depend not only on the agent’s current behaviour, si, and its
compatibility with the norm, but also on past experience, i.e. on the history
until period t, denoted by hi(t), and the specific type of interaction G; i.e.
ci(.) = c(si, hi(t), G),
where the absolute value of c(.) is lower the more negative experience the
agent has gathered in the (recent) past and the less the general context,
G, is evocative of (in our case) cooperative social norms.29 Putting things
together, we obtain a utility function of the following form:
ui(si, s−i, hi(t), G) = (1− ρi) · pii(si, s−i) + ρi · c(si, hi(t), G),
will vary. In fact, it will remain fixed and unaffected by any mental discomfort. However,
to capture individual incentives for decision making, using a relative approach appears
reasonable.
27This implicitly presumes that the set of social norms available is the same for all agents
and that social norms can only be accepted on an all or nothing basis. Yet, adding one
component for each norm adds nothing to our argument but notation.
28Notice that such a change does not affect the validity of the previous argument in
favour of the existence of preferences for identity consistent behaviour. Only the for-
mal argument becomes more involved if we allow for more widespread weights instead of
assuming weights to be either equally split or completely focused on economic rewards.
29In general, there will be far more social conventions and stereotypes than only cooper-
ative norms (see e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Yet, to keep the exposition simple, we
confine our analysis to cooperative behaviour and cooperative norms which have attracted
so much interest in the recent past (cf. Section 4.1).
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where ρi ∈ [0, 1] is the individual specific relative weight of the identity
component in the utility, which we treat as a fixed constituent of player i’s
identity, and s−i denotes the current strategies of the other players.30
It is immediate that generally cooperative agents who base their decisions
on a utility function as the above are less prone to be exploited repeatedly
as we assumed c(.) to diminish with negative experience. Nevertheless, the
reduction of c(.) has to be gradual in order to prevent defectors invading the
society. If economic incentives dominated too quickly, a single defector can
trigger a cascade of defections and, thus, a breakdown of the cooperative
convention. Each agent, having met the defector, afterwards would follow
the purely economic self-interest and would defect himself (at least once),
thereby prompting at least one additional defection, etc.
Summing Up If the matching process allows for patterns, e.g. through
longer episodes of matching with agents from other (unknown) societies, a
more flexible influence of the preference for identity consistent behaviour be-
comes advantageous. Such a flexibility can be achieved if we assume only
the agent’s relative preference for identity consistent behaviour to be fixed,
but allow the respective cost associated with inconsistent behaviour to de-
pend on the general context and (recent) past experience. In particular, if a
decision context bears little connection to cooperative social norms or shar-
ing rules (e.g. an auction / a competitive game of sports) or if the agent’s
past experience does not square with the norm (e.g. if the agent has been
repeatedly exploited in a Prisoner’s Dilemma), this cost ought to be low and
behaviour should mainly be governed by material self-interest. These effects
are independent of the size of the population or the number of participants
of the interaction.
3.2 Implications and Evidence
In the preceding discussion, we have argued that, in a more realistic context,
also norm obedient agents with a preference for identity consistent behaviour
30The discussion in Section 2 corresponds to the case of ρi = 0.5 and a fixed c.
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should not be expected to act as uncontingent cooperators. Instead they
should adjust behaviour according to their past experience and, more gener-
ally, to how evocative the respective context is of cooperative social norms.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss some of the main implications of
our argument for cooperative laboratory experiments. As we will see, these
implications are largely consistent with the evidence.
Implications
Consider again the stylised utility function proposed in the previous subsec-
tion:
ui(si, s−i, hi(t), G) = (1− ρi) · pii(si, s−i) + ρi · c(si, hi(t), G).
In order to make our point, we restrict attention to the case of laboratory
studies of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma or repeated Public Goods games
without punishment or potential segregation of agents. We confine ourselves
to Prisoner’s Dilemma and Public Goods games (without punishment) as for
these games the players’ (stage game) actions intuitively can be thought of
as being ranked on a scale from 0 (purely selfish) to 1 (purely cooperative),
i.e. si ∈ [0, 1].31 Moreover, in view of cooperative social norms, the actions
available for these games entail competing interests in that incentives from
material self-interest are strictly opposed to cooperative behaviour. Put dif-
ferently, irrespective of any other player’s behaviour, each player’s material
payoffs pii are strictly decreasing in the cooperativeness of his behaviour si.
As regards the other ingredients of the above utility function, we assume
that G, i.e. the cooperativeness of the general context, is fixed and equal for
all players,32 and that past experience hi also is measured on a zero-one scale,
i.e. hi ∈ [0, 1] with larger values of hi indicating a more cooperative past
experience. If the agent has no prior experience with the respective context,
31For example, for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, defection can be associated with si = 0 and
cooperation with si = 1; mixed strategies in between. Similarly, for Public Goods games,
si can be associated with the percentage of the endowment contributed to the public good.
32Evidence for the general type of context effects indicated above is provided at the end
of the “Evidence” part of this section.
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we set hi(1) = 1. Otherwise, hi is determined by the average cooperativeness
of all actions (but the agent’s own one) observed in the previous round. Thus,
for given G, the psychologic cost c(si, hi | G) can be written as a function
c(. | G) : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → R− . Assuming c(.) to be twice differentiable, our










i.e. the more (less) cooperative the agent’s past experience (own actual
behaviour) the larger the mental cost of norm-disobedience, i.e. the smaller
is c; and the less cooperative past experience is the weaker is the effect of
own current behaviour (as the inappropriateness of the norm is learned).
Finally, let us assume that players are drawn from a continuum of agents
for which the identity parameter ρ is distributed according to some cdf F
which possesses a continuous density f with full support, i.e. ρ varies from
a complete lack of concern for social norms (ρi = 0) to almost perfect norm
conformity (ρi = 1) in the pool of players. Then, we can state the following
general implications of our argument.
Implication 1 For a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma or Public Goods game
with competing interests but with neither punishment nor potential segre-
gation (e.g. because the matching is fully random), averaging over many
observations, our arguments predicts that:
1. Cooperation rates, i.e. average values of s, decrease over time if for all
agents hi(1) = 1; and the larger the number of agents whose behaviour
can be observed or inferred in the course of the interaction, the more
pronounced the effect will be.
2. Cooperation rates are decreasing in the size of the material rewards
from non-cooperative behaviour.
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Intuitively, Implication 1.1 follows from the full-support assumption about
the distribution of ρi in the population.
33 Thus, if the behaviour of a large
number of agents can be observed, there will (in expectation) always be some-
one for whom material payoffs, pii, immediately dominate. Accordingly, this
agent will choose si ≈ 0. In the next round, then, the past experience with
(unpunished) defection will reduce the psychologic cost from own defection
for all agents because the agents “learn” that norm obedient cooperation is
inappropriate as it cannot be enforced. Hence, over time average defection
rates will increase (as agents cannot avoid defectors either), and so forth; un-
til only those with ρi ≈ 1 keep on following the norm. Reduced observability
regarding other players’ behaviour, however, may impede this unravelling. A
more formal derivation of Implication 1.1 can be found in the appendix. Im-
plication 1.2 follows immediately from the assumptions and the specification
of the utility function.
Evidence
Experimental evidence from the lab, in fact, appears to be largely consistent
with the above implication as well as with the general thrust of the argument
presented in this paper.
As regards Implication 1.1, for example, contribution rates in repeated
Public Goods games (without punishment), where at least aggregate be-
haviour of others can be inferred, are commonly found to decline with rep-
etition (see, e.g. Guala, 2005). More specifically, Duffy and Ochs (2005)
analyse the evolution of behaviour in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
(also without punishment) both in the cases of fixed and random pairings.
Not only do they find declining average cooperation rates in both cases; the
effect is also found to be less pronounced in the case of fixed pairings than
in the case of random parings (where more information about other agents
becomes accessible with time). In fact, regarding fixed pairings Duffy and
33A similar statement can be shown to hold, for example, if we assume ρ to be constant
but instead choose h(1) to be drawn from a continuous full support distribution ranging
from 0 to 1 reflecting the differences in the players’ past experience. What essentially is
necessary for our argument is a diverse perception of the relative strength of psychologic
and monetary incentives, and a subsequent decrease of c for all agents.
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Ochs write (p.14/15) that “the decline in aggregate frequencies of coopera-
tion over time is due to the presence of just a few player types, who very
frequently choose to defect [...].” In other words, more cooperative agents
indeed appear to subsequently adjust to a non-cooperative environment.
In contrast, contribution rates in Public Goods games indeed are found
to be higher if punishment opportunities are available (Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2000). Moreover, there is evidence that it is in particular cooperators who
make use of such an option in order to punish defectors; especially so, if the
punishment comes at a considerable cost to the punisher himself (Falk et. al,
2005).34 Although not explicitly mentioned among the above implications,
these observations are very reassuring as they strongly support our general
line of argument.
As regards Implication 1.2, Camerer (2003, p.46) points out that increas-
ing the payoffs from defection in a Prisoner’s Dileamma game (given coop-
eration of the opponent), in fact, leads to an increase in aggregate observed
defection rates. And a similar effect is reported for Public Goods games.
Here a decrease in the marginal returns from a contribution to the public
good is found to be accompanied by a decrease in aggregate contribution
rates (Camerer, 2003, p.46).
Last but not least, we want to emphasise that there also is extensive evi-
dence which strongly indicates that behaviour indeed depends on the context
in the way indicated above, i.e. that the framing of decisions according to
a social paradigm which is reminiscent of some cooperative norm increases
cooperation rates.35 To cite just a few, gift exchange games, which are usu-
ally framed in a labour context, are well known for comparably high rates
of cooperation (e.g. Brown et al., 2004; Fehr et al., 1998; Ga¨chter and Falk,
2002). In contrast, increased anonymity in dictator games, which clearly re-
duces the social aspects of the decision, is found to decrease the amount of
34Notice that, if the cost incurred by the agent being punished are higher than those
that accrue to the punisher, also defectors may find punishment attractive as it increases
relative fitness.
35See also Wichardt (2005b) for a discussion of the importance of context dependence
for the assessment of the significance of laboratory findings.
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money left (Hoffman et al., 1994). Similarly, minimum acceptable outcomes
in ultimatum games are found to be lower in case of randomised proposals
made by a computer (low social aspect) than in case of human proposals
(Blount, 1995).
Discussion
All in all, the evidence cited above is very much in line with the general im-
plications of our model of utility and the discussion of the context-dependent
influence of social norms on individual decision making. Of course, part of
this evidence is also consistent with the various models of fairness and reci-
procity which are briefly discussed in the next section. This, however, poses
no problem to our argument. Once the importance of cooperative social
norms for a certain context is undoubted, an application of these models on
an as if basis indeed seems justified. Yet, in our view, one conclusion that
can be drawn form the evidence is that any model of utility that eventually
aims to capture what is commonly referred to as social preferences (such as
fairness considerations) should be context dependent - at least to some de-
gree (cf. Wichardt, 2005b). Different from the existing models, the model of
utility proposed in this section satisfies this requirement. It emphasises the
agent’s (selfish) general desire to act in accordance with his identity, i.e. the
social norms internalised by the agent. In conjunction with contextual as-
pects regarding the relevance of these norms, it thereby enables us to roughly
assess ex ante when social preferences are likely to figure prominently in the
agents’ decision making and when they are not. Thus, it may help to clear up
the picture regarding the general relevance of such preferences for economic
decision making.
4 Related Literature
Finally, we put our analysis into the context of the existing literature. In
particular, we discuss how it relates to other approaches which account for
immaterial incentives in utility such as models of fairness and reciprocity
(4.1) or the work of Akerlof and Kranton on economics and identity (4.2).
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As a last step, we briefly indicate how it is connected to the research on
cognitive dissonance in psychology (4.3).36
4.1 Fairness and Reciprocity
As mentioned earlier, many attempts have been made to account for the
seemingly irrational traits in human behaviour such as fairness concerns and
reciprocity through modifications in the concept of utility. Most prominent
among these are the models of fairness (Rabin, 1993), inequity aversion (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) and, more recently, of reciprocity (e.g. Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2004, or Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; see also Charness and
Rabin, 2002).
The main feature these models aim to capture is the seeming concern of
agents for the well-being of others. Accordingly, all these approaches incor-
porate the utility that accrues to other individuals from the interaction into
the utility function of the agent. The particular specifications are different,
though. Roughly speaking, they can be split into two categories according
to whether also the beliefs about the intentions of other players are assumed
to influence the agent’s utility or not.
A prominent example for the latter case is the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
model of inequity aversion. In this type of model, the agents are simply
assumed to have an additional social preference for the equal (or fair) split
(which has to be balanced with pure self-interest). Such an unconditional
preference to forgo economic benefits, however, is difficult to justify from an
evolutionary perspective.
The models in the other category (to which all other papers cited above
belong), therefore, try to circumvent the assumption of unconditional good-
will. To this end, they assume the agent’s utility, as derived from the other
36Also other strands have been pursued to account for the observed inconsistencies with
the rational agents paradigm. For a review of models aiming to resolve the inconsistencies
taking complexity constraints on human cognition into account, see Rubinstein (1998).
For a review of learning models, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
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player’s payoff, to be aligned with the intentions the agent believes the other
player to have towards him.37 Roughly speaking, if Player A ascribes posi-
tive intentions to Player B, he will benefit from being kind to B; if, however,
A ascribes negative intentions to B, he will benefit from being mean to B.
Thus, in a sense, players reciprocate the intentions of their counterparts so
that “well-known” defectors and other reciprocators can be treated differ-
ently. In order to capture such considerations, related evolutionary models
usually assume a (costless) labelling of agents according to past behaviour
(e.g. Nowak and Sigmund, 1998); i.e. reciprocators only cooperate with good
labels. Yet, apart from other difficulties, these models commonly fail to give
a proper account of cooperative behaviour if the interaction is anonymous or
one-shot or if the underlying population is large, so that a single agent has
to keep track of the labelling of many others (cf. Henrich, 2004).
The present argument, which allows us to largely avoid these difficulties,
offers an intuitive way to nonetheless motivate (e.g.) fairness concerns in
the agents’ utility considerations for various instances (i.e. whenever the
respective norms are evolutionary advantageous). Moreover, through the
reference to social norms, it enables us to (roughly) assess ax ante when such
considerations are of less relevance to the agents’ decision (depending on the
salience of the respective norms). Accordingly, we do not view our approach
as a general substitute for any of the others - including the rational paradigm
- but rather as an intuitive attempt to put them into perspective.
4.2 Economics and Identity
The first ones to emphasise the importance of identity for economic analysis
were Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In their seminal paper, they conclusively
outline the behavioural consequences that arise if an individual distaste for
identity threatening acts, both by himself and by others, is taken into ac-
count. In a later paper, Akerlof and Kranton (2005) extend their discussion
and emphasise the positive effects of a strong association with a group on
37These models all draw on the notion of psychologic games as introduced by Geanako-
plos et al. (1989).
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the degree of cooperative behaviour with/within that group.38 Concerning
utility they write that: “a person’s identity describes gains and losses in util-
ity from behaviour that conforms or departs from the norms for particular
social categories in particular situations” (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005, p. 12)
- which, in fact, is very much in line with the spirit of our analysis.
More recently, the discussion of identity has also been taken up, for ex-
ample, by Benabou and Tirole (2006a, 2006b). In the 2006a paper, they
demonstrate nicely how a social signalling aspect combined with an individ-
ual concern for prosocial behaviour, which may be interpreted in terms of
identity, affects contributions to social goods in an intuitive way. In their
later paper, Benabou and Tirole (2006b) provide an illuminating account of
how various puzzling economic as well as social phenomena (e.g. taboos) can
be rationalised under the assumption that decision makers tend to infer past
motivations, i.e. information about their identity, from past choices.
4.3 Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive Dissonance is a psychologic phenomenon the discussion of which
can be traced back to Festinger (1957).39 The term cognitive dissonance
refers to the cost an individual incurs if he, out of his own volition, behaves
in a way that is incompatible with (or threatens) his overall perception of self-
integrity - his identity; e.g. to smoke despite a health-conscious self-image or
to defect despite an internalised cooperative norm. The discrepancy between
ideal and actual behaviour, according to psychology, causes a kind of mental
distress called cognitive dissonance which agents will tend to avoid.
Clearly, the concept of cognitive dissonance is closely related to the Ak-
erlof and Kranton discussion about economics and identity as well as to our
analysis. In particular, the apparent evidence that self-inconsistent behaviour
indeed causes mental distress very much supports the assumption that such
38See Wichardt (2005a) for a discussion of how this argument extends to the case where
the individual’s identity is based on the association with more than one group.
39See Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) for a more recent treatise. See Akerlof and Dickens
(1982), for a discussion of the economic relevance of this phenomenon.
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metal costs are also taken into account in the agent’s economic decision mak-
ing. Nonetheless, we are not aware of any other evolutionary approach to
this issue. Yet, it is of course very reassuring that psychologists are able to
identify today what we just claimed to be evolutionarily advantageous.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have outlined an evolutionary argument in favour of an in-
dividual preference for identity-consistent behaviour, where identity refers to
the social norms and values internalised by the individual. Based on this ar-
gument, we have proposed a stylised model of utility which basically assumes
that what is relevant for economic decision making beyond material payoffs is
obedience with social norms. Moreover, the degree to which such additional
considerations influence utility and, hence, individual decision making is as-
sumed to reflect the salience of these norms in the respective context as well
as the individual’s general focus on these aspects (determined by his or her
identity). As we have argued, the general implications of such a specification
of utility are very much in line with the evidence.
In our view, one advantage of the current, indirect approach to justify a
cooperative trait in human behaviour (via identity and norms) is that it puts
a stronger emphasis on the social aspects of human interaction (e.g. social
norms). As we did not set out to prove the evolutionary advantage of co-
operative behaviour per se, we were able to avoid many of the shortcomings
commonly connected to such attempts, such as (e.g.) a costless mechanism
separating “the good” from “the bad” or a restrictedness of the argument
to two person interactions or small groups (cf. Henrich, 2004).40 Moreover,
the current approach allows us to accommodate aspects of both the rational
40cf. Section 1. Another point emphasised by Henrich (2004) is that most existing
approaches fail to explain why especially humans are so much more cooperative than
almost all other animals. Although a discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is interesting to note that the complexity of the social mechanism employed in this
paper, i.e. the norm including different levels of (costly) punishment, may be interpreted
as necessitating skills we would be inclined to only ascribe to us (humans) but not to other
species.
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paradigm and the more recent models of fairness and reciprocity according to
the context of the decision. In particular, the pure rational agents model will
prove most valuable in neutral, purely competitive circumstances (e.g. auc-
tions).41 As soon as social norms (or stereotypes) become more pronounced,
however, additional incentives related to identity have to be accounted for.
This is when, in our view, the models of fairness and reciprocity, which usu-
ally fit the data quite well in these instances, come into play.
Yet, it is only when we know why the agents care about (e.g.) fairness
that we are able to ex ante assess the relative strength of such considerations
in a certain context. And it is only when we know what influences the agents’
beliefs about the intentions of their opponents - e.g. awareness of the social
aspects of a decision and the relevant norms - that we are able to make
reliable (though rough) predictions about how this will affect the agents’
decision making. The present discussion, which intended to shed some light
on these issues, may help to clarify which model is most appropriate under
which circumstances or whether even new models accounting for different
social norms are necessary.
Appendix
Notation In the sequel, relative frequencies of the different strategies in the
society are denoted by λ∗, λ˜, λ, λˆ, and λ′, where λ∗ refers to strategy s∗
and so forth.
Proof of Proposition 2
From Lemma 1, we know that for c > 2 any undominated full support
profile σ will assign positive probability to the strategies s∗, s˜, and s only
(as all agents are assumed to possess an id-preference). Hence, s∗ is the
σ-prevailing strategy for the I-agents. What remains to be shown is that,
under conditions specified in Proposition 2, the I-agents are the σ-dominant
for any undominated full support profile σ.
41Complexity considerations regarding decision making are deliberately neglected here.
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In order to do so, we first show that s will prevail among the I-agents.
Given the matching procedure the expected per period payoff of s is given
by
Epi(s | σ) = q · (4 · λ
λ+ λ˜
+ 7 · λ˜
λ+ λ˜
) + (1− q) · (5λ∗ + 4λ+ 7λ˜).
The expected per period payoff of s˜ is given
Epi(s˜ | σ) = q · (3 · λ
λ+ λ˜
+ 6 · λ˜
λ+ λ˜
) + (1− q) · (6λ∗ + 3λ+ 6λ˜).
A payoff comparison yields that Epi(s | σ) > Epi(s˜ | σ) is equivalent to
q >
λ∗ − λ− λ˜
1 + λ∗ − λ− λ˜ .
As
λ∗ − λ− λ˜




this is always satisfied given the restriction on q. Thus, s is σ-prevailing
among the I-agents for all undominated full support profiles σ.
To show that the I-agents are dominant and, hence, that s∗ is the unique
σGPS, it suffices to show that s∗ earns higher expected payoff than s if only
these two strategies are present. In this case expected per period payoffs are
given by
Epi(s∗ | σ) = 6q + (1− q) · (6λ∗ + λ)− ξ,
and
Epi(s | σ) = 4q + (1− q) · (5λ∗ + 4λ).
Again, using that λ∗ = 1− λ, a payoff comparison shows that Epi(s∗ | σ) >
Epi(s | σ) is equivalent to
q > 1− 2− ξ
1 + 4λ
.
As we have not developed any restrictions on λ during the repetition of
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the interaction, λ may get close to 1. However, even for λ = 1, the above
condition for q is satisfied if q > 3+ξ
5
, as is required in the proposition. Thus,
for any undominated full support profile σ, s∗ is the unique σGPS under the
conditions specified in the proposition. q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3
In order to prove Proposition 3, we first show that, under the conditions
specified in the proposition, s∗ is σ-prevailing among the I-agents and that s
is σ-prevailing among the I-agents for any undominated full support profile
σ. From the proof of Proposition 2 it then follows that s∗ is σGPS as we
imposed the same restrictions on q. The properties of N∗ are derived in the
course of the main argument.
We begin with the I-agents. There are three types of strategies among
these agents, namely s∗, sˆ, and s′. The expected per period payoffs for these
are given by:
Epi(s∗ | σ) = q · 6λ∗+6λˆ+λ′
λ∗+λˆ+λ′
+ (1− q) · (6λ∗ + 6λˆ+ 6λ˜+ λ′ + λ)− ξ
Epi(sˆ | σ) = q · 6λ∗+6λˆ+3λ′
λ∗+λˆ+λ′
+ (1− q) · (6λ∗ + 6λˆ+ 6λ˜+ 3λ′ + 3λ)
Epi(s′ | σ) = q · 5λ∗+7λˆ+4λ′
λ∗+λˆ+λ′
+ (1− q) · (5λ∗ + 7λˆ+ 7λ˜+ 4λ′ + 4λ)
What we have to show is that for N sufficiently large it holds that
Epiτ (s∗ | σ) > Epiτ (s | σ) ·P τ (s | σ), for s ∈ {sˆ, s′}. As at least Epiτ (s∗ | σ) >
Epiτ (sˆ | σ), we need to consider the relegation probabilities. For all repe-
titions τ , the probability that the offspring of an agent playing one of the
above strategies remains among the I-agents can be estimated as follows:
P τ (s∗ | σ) = 1, P τ (sˆ | σ) < (1− ατ )N , and P τ (s′ | σ) < (1− ατ )2N ,
where ατ = αˆ · λ∗τλ∗τ+λˆτ+λ′τ with λτ denoting the fraction of agents playing the
respective strategy in repetition τ of the interaction. Thus, the condition
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+ (1− q) · (6λ∗ + 6λˆ+ 6λ˜+ λ′ + λ)− ξ
q · 6λ∗+6λˆ+3λ′
λ∗+λˆ+λ′
+ (1− q) · (6λ∗ + 6λˆ+ 6λ˜+ 3λ′ + 3λ)
> (1− α)N ;
or equivalently
ln(A)
ln(1− α) < N.
If N is sufficiently large such that s∗ always does better than sˆ among the








as ξ < 1, it holds that









+ (1− q) · 3
=: B,
and that for all τ
1− ατ ≤ 1− α0 = 1− αˆ · λ
∗
0








Similarly, the requirement that Epiτ (s∗ | σ) > Epiτ (s′ | σ) · P τ (s′ | σ) is




+ (1− q) · (6λ∗ + 6λˆ+ 6λ˜+ λ′ + λ)− ξ
q · 5λ∗+7λˆ+4λ′
λ∗+λˆ+λ′
+ (1− q) · (5λ∗ + 7λˆ+ 7λ˜+ 4λ′ + 4λ)




2 ln(1− α) .
Accordingly, we obtain as a second condition for N∗ which again is indepen-
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dent of τ :
N∗ >
ln(D)






















then s∗ is σ-prevailing among the I-agents for any undominated full support
profile σ. Moreover, N∗ is a function of q, αˆ and the initial distribution
of strategies given by σ. The signs of the derivatives of N∗ given in the
proposition follow immediately from the above conditions.
We now turn to the I-agents. For these, we have to consider s˜ and s, the
expected per period payoff of which is given by:
Epi(s˜ | σ) = q · 6λ˜+3λ
λ˜+λ
+ (1− q) · (6λ∗ + 6λˆ+ 6λ˜+ 3λ′ + 3λ)
Epi(s | σ) = q · 7λ˜+4λ
λ˜+λ
+ (1− q) · (5λ∗ + 7λˆ+ 7λ˜+ 4λ′ + 4λ)
We show that Epi(s˜ | σ) < Epi(s | σ) for all repetitions. As all offspring
of the I-agents will again be part of the I-agents, this is sufficient to prove
that s is σ prevailing for the I-agents. Now Epi(s˜ | σ) < Epi(s | σ) can be
rewritten as
q · λ˜+ λ
λ˜+ λ
+ (1− q) · (−λ∗ + λˆ+ λ˜+ λ′ + λ) > 0.







which is always satisfied as we required q > 3+ξ
5
in the proposition. Thus,
by the last step of the proof of Proposition 2, it follows that s∗ is σGPS
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for any undominated full support profiles σ (given the requirements of the
proposition). q.e.d.
Derivation of Implication 1.1
We prove the statement under the simplifying assumption that all players
can actually observe all other decision made the whole pool of players in
any round. Let cn denote the cost of norm disobedience in period n of the
interaction By assumption c1 = c(., 1, G) is equal for all agents and unaffected
by any negative past experience. Thus, an agent who maximises his utility






otherwise, boundary solutions obtain.
As we assumed ρ to be distributed according to some continuous full
support distribution F , it follows that h(2) < 1 = h(1) for all agents as at
least some players will not fully cooperate in the first round but can neither be
punished of that nor be avoided in the later rounds. From this it follows that
c2(si) < c1(si), for all si, as we assumed
∂2c
∂h∂si
> 0. Due to the distributional
assumption on ρ, the process unravels so that also c3 < c2 and so forth, until
only h(t) ≈ 0.
Obviously, if the number of agents that can be observed is small, the
process will be slower or may even fail to start. Averaging over many few-
agent-interactions, though, it will still be visible (due to the distributional
assumptions made). Notice, however, that if c1 is already reduced before the
start of the interaction, either for all agents or only for those who then choose
to defect in period 1, the process of unravelling may fail to start. q.e.d.
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